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RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES:
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INDONESIA CAPITAL
MARKET
Dody Hapsoro

YKPN School of Business
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
dodyhapsoro@gmai.com

Anna Fauzia Fadhilla
YKPN School of Business
Yogyakarta, Indonesia

The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate
governance (CG), corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, and economic
consequences. Broadly speaking, the CG variables consist of ownership structure
and management/control structure. The CSR disclosure variables consist of
economic, environmental, social, human rights, societal, and product responsibility
dimensions. The economic consequences variables consist of bid-ask spreads,
trading volume, and share price volatility.
The hypotheses are tested using a structural equation modeling analysis with 210
samples of listed firms on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2014. The result of this
study is as follows: (1) the effect of the proportion of board of directors from the
board of commissioners and the audit committee on the CSR disclosure is positive
and significant; (2) the effect of the proportion of independent commissioners
and the audit committee from the board of commissioners, the audit committee,
and the board of directors on CSR disclosure is positive and significant; and (3) the
effect of CSR disclosure on trading volume is positive and significant.

Abstract

Abstrak

The main implication of this study is that CSR disclosure activities have a very
important role in meeting stakeholders’ interests and ensuring the sustainability of
the company long-term. In addition, CSR disclosure is considered to be an assertion
of a company’s brand differentiation, which means obtaining operating licenses
both from the government and society, and the company’s risk management
strategy.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, economic
consequences
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui hubungan antara corporate
governance (CG), corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, dan konsekuensi
ekonomi. Secara umum, variabel CG terdiri dari struktur kepemilikan dan struktur
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manajemen / pengendalian. Variabel pengungkapan CSR terdiri dari dimensi
ekonomi, lingkungan, sosial, hak asasi manusia, masyarakat, dan produk.
Variabel konsekuensi ekonomi terdiri dari spread bid-ask, volume perdagangan,
dan volatilitas harga saham.
Hipotesis diuji dengan menggunakan analisis pemodelan persamaan struktural
dengan 210 sampel perusahaan terbuka di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun
2014. Hasil penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut: (1) pengaruh proporsi dewan
direksi dari dewan komisaris dan komite audit pengungkapan CSR bersifat positif
dan signifikan; (2) pengaruh proporsi komisaris independen dan komite audit dari
dewan komisaris, komite audit, dan dewan direksi mengenai pengungkapan CSR
bersifat positif dan signifikan; dan (3) pengaruh pengungkapan CSR terhadap
volume perdagangan adalah positif dan signifikan.
Implikasi utama dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa kegiatan pengungkapan CSR
memiliki peran yang sangat penting dalam memenuhi kepentingan pemangku
kepentingan dan memastikan keberlanjutan perusahaan dalam jangka panjang.
Selain itu, pengungkapan CSR dianggap sebagai penegasan diferensiasi merek
perusahaan, yang berarti memperoleh lisensi operasi baik dari pemerintah
maupun masyarakat, dan strategi manajemen risiko perusahaan.
Kata kunci: tata kelola perusahaan, tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan,
konsekuensi ekonomi

T

oday, companies in Indonesia
are facing challenges in
implementing ethical standards
in responsible business practices known
as corporate social responsibility
(CSR). In part, these challenges are due
to the fact that CSR is no longer merely
beneficial to external stakeholders, but
it is also beneficial to the companies that
implement it. Werther and Chandler
(2011), Porter and Kramer (2006),
and Sirsly and Lamertz (2008) stated
that to date, CSR has only been seen
as an effort to minimize risk; however,
through its continued development,
CSR has also become part of efforts
to maximize opportunities. In other
words, CSR disclosure is an effort
by a company to meet the interests
of its stakeholders and ensure the
sustainability of the company longterm. CSR is considered to affirm the
company brand differentiation, which
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means obtaining licenses to operate
from both the government and society,
and its risk management strategy
(Suharto, 2008).
The structure of corporate governance
(CG) at a company can be used as
the supporting infrastructure for the
practices and disclosure of CSR in
Indonesia. This concept is in line
with Jo and Harjoto (2002), who
stated that the CG variables positively
affect firms’ CSR engagement. A
corporate governance structure is
often a combination of various internal
and external mechanisms. Internal
mechanisms are the foremost sets
of controls for a corporation. These
controls monitor the progress and
activities of the organization and take
corrective actions when the business
goes off track. The external mechanisms
are controlled by factors outside an
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organization and serve the company’s
objectives. External mechanisms
include regulators, governments, trade
unions, and financial institutions.

changes in accounting policies despite
the fact that the change in accounting
policy has no direct influence on cash
flow.

The structure of CG is expected to
reduce the information asymmetry.
The results of a study by Cormier et
al. (2010) showed that some formal
monitoring attributes (board and audit
committee size) as well as the extent of
voluntary governance disclosure reduce
information asymmetry. Information
asymmetry leads to adverse selection
and moral hazard, which ultimately
leads to a lack of CSR practices
being implemented. As a result,
stakeholders may not be able to give
a reward (punishment) for companies
that implement CSR practices (do not
practice CSR) (Utama, 2007).

CSR practices and disclosure in
developed countries are thought to
produce fewer economic consequences
compared to the practices and
disclosure of CSR in developing
countries because CSR is common
for investors in developed countries.
Therefore, researchers are motivated to
prove whether investors in developing
countries such as Indonesia are
concerned about the disclosure of CSR
information when they make a decision
on the capital market, as it will have an
impact on the economic consequences,
namely in the form of a decrease in
bid-ask spreads, an increase in trading
volume, and a decrease in share price
volatility (Hapsoro, 2006).

CSR reporting initiated by Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) emerged as
a result of the concept of sustainability
development. GRI guidelines state that
a company must explain the impact of its
corporate activity on three dimensions:
the economy, environment, and society
as part of their standard disclosure.
These three dimensions were later
expanded into six dimensions, namely
economic, environmental, social (labor
practices), human rights, society,
and product responsibility (Cheng &
Christiawan, 2011).
According to Zeff (1978), economic
consequences are the impact of
accounting reports on the decisionmaking behavior of businesses,
governments, unions, investors, and
creditors. This concept that asserts that,
despite the implications of efficient
securities market theory, accounting
policy choice can affect firm value.
Economic consequences are necessary
to know the market’s response to

LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate Governance
According to Lins and Warnock
(2004), in general, the mechanism
that controls management behavior
is often called CG mechanisms. This
mechanism can be classified into
two groups. The first is firm-specific
internal mechanisms, which consists of
the firm’s ownership structure and the
firm’s control structure. The second is
country-specific external mechanisms,
which consists of the rule of law and
the market for corporate control.
In this study, the discussion of the CG
mechanism is focused on the roles
of firm-specific internal mechanisms
rather than country-specific external
mechanisms. The external mechanisms
are not discussed because the study
was conducted in a specific country

166

The South East Asian Journal of Management • Vol. 11 • No. 2 • 2017 • 164-182

(Indonesia), and therefore there is no
difference in the rules applicable to
all companies operating in Indonesia,
and the market for corporate control
(hostile takeover) is very rare in
Indonesia.
Firms’ Ownership Structure
Firms’ ownership structure consists
of managerial ownership, domestic
institutional
ownership,
foreign
institutional ownership, and public
ownership. The following is a
discussion of each form of firm
ownership structure.
Proportions of Managerial Ownership
(PKMA)
Managerial ownership is a condition
wherein managers have a stake in the
company or the managers are also
corporate shareholders (Rustiarini,
2011). Managers are those who sit
on the board of commissioners and
board of directors of the company. The
presence of managers and shareholders
is expected to play a role in encouraging
companies to perform CSR disclosure.
Managerial ownership structure can
be measured in accordance with the
proportion of ordinary shares held by
management and can be formulated as
follows:

Proportion of Domestic Institutional
Ownership (PKID)
Domestic institutional ownership is
ownership of the parties in the form of
institutions, such as foundations, banks,
insurance companies, investment
companies, pension funds, corporate,
and other institutions. Institutions
usually control the majority stake
because they have greater resources
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than the other shareholders. The
existence of domestic institutions as
shareholders is expected to play a role
in encouraging companies to perform
CSR disclosure. The ownership
structure of domestic institutions can
be measured in proportion to the shares
held by the owners of the institution
and can be formulated as follows:

Proportion of Foreign Institutional
Ownership (PKIO)
Foreign institutional ownership is
the number of shares held by foreign
institutions. Foreign institutions in a
company are parties that are considered
to be concerned about the disclosure of
CSR (Machmud & Djakman, 2008).
The existence of foreign institutions
as shareholders is expected to play
a role in encouraging companies to
perform CSR disclosure. The structure
of foreign institutional ownership can
be measured in accordance with the
proportion of ordinary shares held
by foreign institutions and can be
formulated as follows:

Firms’ Control Structure
Firms’ control structure consists of the
proportion of the board of directors
from the board of commissioners and
the audit committee; the proportion of
the board of directors from the board
of commissioners, audit committee,
and board of directors; the proportion
of independent commissioners and
the audit committee from the board
of commissioners and the audit
committee; and the proportion of
independent commissioners and the
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audit committee from the board of
commissioners, audit committee, and
board of directors.
Proportion of the Board of Directors
from the Board of Commissioners and
Audit Committee (PDKA)
The proportion of the board of directors
from the board of commissioners
and audit committee is formulated as
follows:
PDKA =

The number of the board of directors
The number of board of commissioners
+ The number of audit committee

x100%

Proportion of the Board of Directors
from the Board of Commissioners,
Audit Committee, and Board of
Directors (PDDK)
The proportion of the board of directors
from the board of commissioners, audit
committee, and board of directors is
formulated as follows:
PDDK =

The number of the board of directors
x100%
The number of board commissioners
+ The number of audit committee
+ The number of boards of directors

Proportion
of
Independent
Commissioners and Audit Committee
from the Board of Commissioners and
Audit Committee (PKKA)
The proportion of independent
commissioners and audit committee
from the board of commissioners
and audit committee is formulated as
follows:
The number of independent commissioners

+ The number of audit committee
PKKA =
The number of board commissioners
+ The number of audit committee

x100%

Proportion
of
Independent
Commissioners and Audit Committee
from the Board of Commissioners,
Audit Committee, and Board of
Directors (PKDK)
The proportion of independent
commissioners and audit committee

from the board of commissioners, audit
committee, and board of directors is
formulated as follows:
The number of independent commissioners
+ The number of audit committee
PKDK =
x100%
The number of board commissioners
+ The number of audit committee

+ The number of the board of directors

Disclosure of
Responsibility

Corporate

Social

Guthrie and Parker (1990) stated that
the disclosure of CSR information
in the annual report is one way that
companies build, maintain, and
legitimize their economic and political
contributions. Various reasons for the
company’s voluntary disclosure of
CSR information has been investigated
in previous studies, and include
compliance with existing regulations,
to meet the expectations of society
(Deegan & Blomquist, 2001) and
gaining a competitive advantage
through the implementation of CSR
(Hasnas, 1998).
The GRI Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines
The GRI Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines
offer
Reporting
Principles, Standard Disclosures,
and an Implementation Manual for
the preparation of sustainability
reports by organizations, regardless
of their size, sector, or location. The
guidelines also offer an international
reference for all those interested in
the disclosure of governance approach
and of the environmental, social, and
economic performance and impacts
of organizations. The guidelines are
useful in the preparation of any type of
document that requires such disclosure
and were developed through a global
multi-stakeholder process involving
representatives from business, labor,
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civil society, and financial markets,
as well as auditors and experts in
various fields. Those in close dialogue
with regulators and governmental
agencies in several countries also
contributed. The guidelines were
developed
in
alignment
with
internationally recognized reportingrelated
documents,
which
are
referenced throughout the guidelines.
Measurement of the value of CSR
is performed using a dichotomy
measurement system, namely by
providing number 1 if there is an item
of CSR disclosure in a company’s
annual report sample and the number
0 if there is no disclosure item in the
company’s annual report sample.
Economic Consequences
Zeff (1978), in the article “The Rise
of Economic Consequences,” defined
economic consequences as the
impact of accounting reports on the
decision-making behavior of business,
government, unions, investors, and
creditors. In Leuz and Wysocki’s (2008)
study, the economic consequences
translated as the impact of disclosure
policy changes on a company’s
financial statements. Meanwhile,
Gozali et al. (2002) indicated
economic consequences were incurred
by non-financial information, that is,
environmental disclosures contained
in the annual report. The essence of
this definition is that the accounting
report can affect real decisions by
managers and others in spite of reports
and changes in the accounting report
not affecting cash flow.
Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information is a situation
in which one party in a transaction
has more or superior information
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compared to another, so certain
consequences will only be known by
one party. When there is asymmetric
information, disclosure decisions
made by the manager can influence
share prices because the asymmetric
information between more informed
investors and less informed investors
raises transaction costs and reduces the
expected liquidity in the stock market
(Komalasari, 2000).
Bid-Ask Spreads
Bid-ask spreads (BASP) are the
difference between the selling price
and the purchase price. High bid-ask
spreads arise because of the cost of
asymmetric information. The cost is
incurred because the the informed
traders and uninformed traders do
not have the same information. This
imbalance of information leads to the
emergence of moral hazard behavior.
To reduce the possibility of such
losses, uninformed traders will tend
to increase the spread to minimize
losses. Therefore, the decreases in
asymmetric information can reduce
the spread between bid and ask prices.
Alleged disclosure of CSR negatively
affects BASP. The formula for bid-ask
spreads is:
SPREADi,t =

{(bidi,t − aski,t) / (bidi,t + aski,t) / 2} x100
n

Description:
Spreadi,t = Average
difference
between the highest
buying price and the
lowest selling price
based on the daily price
of firm i for one year.
Ask
= Lowest selling price
(low) or price demand.
Bid
= Highest buying price
(high) or offer price.
n
= Number of trading
days during one year.
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Trading Volume
Trading volume (TRVO) reflects the
strength of supply and demand, which
is a reflection of investor behavior.
The increasing volume of supply and
demand for a stock increases TRVO. A
high TRVO indicates that a company’s
stock attractive to investors. By
engaging in CSR disclosure practices,
it is expected that a company’s shares
are more attractive to investors.
Therefore, the alleged disclosure of
CSR positively affects TRVO (Zidni,
2014). The trading volume calculation
formula is as follows:
n

VPSi =

∑VPS
t=1

i,t

n

Description:
VPSi = Average daily stock
trading volume of firm i
for one year.
VPSi,t = Volume of daily stock
trading firm i from the
beginning of the year
until the end of the year.
= Number of transactions a
n
day for a year.
Share Price Volatility
Firmansyah (2006) stated that share
price volatility (SPV) is a statistical
measurement of fluctuations in stock
prices over a certain period. These
measurements do not measure the
level of prices, but rather the degree of
variance within a short period. The SPV
is often equated with risk. The higher
the SPV, the higher the stock price
will rise and drop so that it will apply
“high risk high return” and vice versa.
In general, companies that have a high
SPV are companies that are unstable,
whereas companies with lower SPV
are stable companies. Companies that

disclose CSR are assumed to be more
stable, since stable companies are
better able to practice CSR. Therefore,
in this study, CSR is alleged to have a
negative influence on SPV. The share
price volatility formula is as follows:
n

σ i2 =

∑( X
t=1

i,t

− Xi )

2

n −1

Description:

σ i2
σi
Xi,t

=
=
=

Xi

=

n

=

Variance.
Standard deviation.
Each daily stock price
of firm i for one year.
Average daily stock
price of firm i.
The number of trading
days during one year.

Hypothesis Formulation
Effect of Managerial Ownership on
CSR Disclosure
According to agency theory, the
greater the managerial ownership in
the company, the more information
the manager has than the investors.
This means managers will act only in
their personal interests, i.e., not doing
CSR voluntarily for the benefit of the
company. Greater CSR disclosure
allegedly would harm managers as
the party who has more information.
Research conducted by Rustiarini
(2011) showed that managerial
ownership negatively affects CSR
disclosure. Managerial ownership is
generally relatively small. This causes
the manager to not be able to maximize
the value of the company. Based on the
above explanation, the hypothesis can
be formulated as follows:
H1 : The proportion of managerial
ownership negatively affects CSR
disclosure.
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Effects of Domestic Institutional
Ownership on CSR Disclosure
According to Matoussi dan Raida
(2008), institutional investors have the
power and experience to be responsible
for applying the principles of corporate
governance in order to protect the rights
and interests of all shareholders, so they
require companies to communicate
transparently. Susanti and Riharjo’s
(2013) research showed that domestic
institutional ownership positively
affects CSR disclosure. Based on the
above explanation, the hypothesis can
be formulated as follows:
H2 : The proportion of domestic
institutional ownership positively
affects CSR disclosure.
Effect of Foreign Institutional
Ownership on CSR Disclosure
Countries in continental Europe and
the United States pay more attention
to environmental problems and social
issues. In other words, if a company has
a contract with foreign stakeholders
in both ownership and trade, the
company will be supported fully in the
implementation and disclosure of CSR
(Machmud & Djakman, 2008). Aini
and Cahyonowati’s (2011) research
showed that foreign ownership has
a positive effect on CSR disclosure.
Based on the above explanation,
the hypothesis can be formulated as
follows:
H3 : The proportion of foreign
institutional ownership positively
affects CSR disclosure.
Effect of Public Ownership on CSR
Disclosure
Hasibuan (2001) explained that the
company whose shares are mostly
held by the public will make greater
disclosures. Research by Lamia et al.
(2014) showed that public ownership
has a positive effect on CSR disclosure.
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Based on the above explanation,
the hypothesis can be formulated as
follows:
H4: The proportion of public ownership
positively affects CSR disclosure.
Effect of Proportion of the Board of
Directors on CSR Disclosure
Chen and Jaggi (2000) stated that the
size of the board of directors affects
the level of voluntary disclosure,
which is a strategic decision made
by the board of directors. As the top
management, the board of directors
formulates policies and strategies to
be followed by the manager. Chen and
Jaggi (2000) stated that the board of
directors may reduce the possibility
of asymmetric information. Iswadi’s
(2013) study showed that the size
of the board of directors negatively
affects CSR disclosure. Based on these
explanations, the following hypotheses
can be formulated:
H5 : The proportion of the board
of directors from the board of
commissioners and audit committee
negatively affects CSR disclosure.
H6 : The proportion of the board
of directors from the board of
commissioners, board of directors,
and audit committee negatively affects
CSR disclosure.
Effect of Proportion of Independent
Commissioner and Audit Committee
on CSR Disclosure
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that the
greater the number of commissioners,
the easier it is to control the CEO,
and the control will be more effective.
Badjuri’s (2011) study showed that
independent commissioners positively
affect CSR disclosure. This suggests
that the presence of independent
directors in the company provides
positive control in overseeing
management’s
CSR
disclosing
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activities. The audit committee consists
of individuals who are independent
and not involved with the daily tasks
of the board of commissioners and has
the experience to conduct effective
oversight function. Research by
Iswandika et al. (2014) showed that the
audit committee positively affects CSR
disclosure. This shows that the larger
the size of the audit committee, the
more effective the audit committee’s
role is in controlling and monitoring
the top management. Based on the
above explanations, the following
hypotheses can be formulated:
H7 : The proportion of independent
commissioners and the audit committee
from the board of commissioners and
audit committee positively affect CSR
disclosure.
H8 : The proportion of independent
commissioners and the audit committee
from the board of commissioners,
board of directors, and audit committee
positively affect CSR disclosure.
Effect of CSR Disclosure on the BidAsk Spread
Krinsky and Lee (1996) suggested that
the desire to reduce the asymmetry
of information can be implemented
by testing and examining the bid-ask
spreads of the company. He showed
that when the bid-ask spread decreased,
the asymmetry of information is
also decreased. The smaller bidask spreads that occurred indicated
reduced information asymmetry and
reflected the positive market response
to the information contained in the
publication of the financial report.
Therefore, disclosure of CSR has an
alleged negative effect on the bidask spreads. Based on the above
explanations, the hypothesis can be
formulated as follows:
H9 : CSR disclosure negatively affects
the bid-ask spread.

Effect of CSR Disclosure on the
Trading Volume
High trading volume indicates that
the stock is attractive to investors.
Companies that perform CSR
disclosure are expected to be
increasingly in demand by investors.
Therefore, CSR is thought to have a
positive influence on trading volume
(Zidni, 2014). Vijaya’s (2012) study
showed that CSR disclosure has a
positive and significant effect on
trading volume. This means that the
company’s CSR disclosure in the
annual report is able to influence the
market reaction. Based on the above
explanations, the hypothesis can be
formulated as follows:
H10 : CSR disclosure positively affects
trading volume.
Effect of CSR Disclosure on Share
Price Volatility
A lower of share price volatility
indicates a smaller asymmetry of
information. In general, a company that
has low volatility is a stable company.
Companies that disclose CSR well are
assumed to be stable companies and
have a lower information asymmetry.
CSR is expected to have an impact on
the low share price volatility. Therefore,
disclosure of CSR allegedly negatively
affects the share price volatility.
Based on the above explanations,
the hypothesis can be formulated as
follows:
H11 : CSR disclosure negatively affects
the share price volatility.
RESEARCH METHOD
Population and Sample
In this study, the population consists
of all public companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014.
The selection of the 2014 study period
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Table 1. Sample Determination Procedure
Description

Amount

The company is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in
the period Reporting of 2014
The company is the industry’s low profile 228
The company conducted an IPO in 2013-2014
The company does not have a complete stock price data and the
value of the stock price individuals
The company does not publish an annual report or not disclose
social responsibility information in annual reports
The company has the value of the bid-ask spreads, trading
volume and share price volatility equal to zero
Total company sample

505
228
36
2
17
12
210

Source: Data processing results
was chosen because the G4 GRI
Disclosure Guideline was published
in 2013, and it was expected that the
data obtained and the results of the
study reflect the current state of affairs.
To obtain the answers to the research
questions, the researchers used annual
reports, sustainability reporting, and
daily stock prices as their data sources.
The data was obtained through the
IDX website and the website of each
company.
The sample determination procedure is
shown in Table 1 above.
Data Analysis Techniques
This study used Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM) and the analytical
tool used in this method is the software
Partial Least Squares (PLS). SEMPLS is a causal modeling approach
that aims to maximize the variance of
the latent variable criterion that can
be explained (explained variance) by
latent predictor variables.
The PLS software used is called
WarpPLS. Some of the advantages

173

of the WarpPLS program are: (1)
estimates the p-value for the path
coefficient automatically; (2) provides
an indicator of fit model that can be
useful when comparing the best model
among various different models;
(3) delivers coefficient results and p
value for moderation models directly;
(4) gives effect size value, i.e.,
f-squared effect size; (5) provides full
collinearity test value that can be used
to analyze the problems of vertical
and lateral multicollinearity; and (6)
provides an output of the predictive
validity value in the form of the Stone
Geisser Q-squared Coefficient (Solihin
& Ratmono, 2013).
Research Model
The research framework is shown in
Figure 1 below.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
CSR disclosure scores are shown in
Table 2 below:

The South East Asian Journal of Management • Vol. 11 • No. 2 • 2017 • 164-182

Corporate Governance
(CG)
Ownership Structure
Proportion of Managerial Ownership
(PKMA)
- Proportion of Domestic Institutional Ownership (PKID)
- Proportion of Foreign
Institutional Ownership (PKIA)
- Proportion of Public
Ownership (PKPU)

Economic
Consequences
(EC)

-

Information Asymmetry
Corporate Social
Responsibility
Disclosure (CSRD)

Management/Control
Structure
Proportion of DD
from DK and KA
(PDKA)
- Proportion of DD
from DK, DD and KA
(PDDK)
- Proportion of KI and
KA from DK and KA
(PKKA)
- Proportion of KI and
KA from DK, DD,
dan KA (PKDK)

Bid-Ask Spread
(BASP)
- Trading Volume
(TRVO)
- Share Price Volatility
(SPV)

-

Notes:
DD =
DK =
KA =
KI =

Board of Directors
Board of Commissioners
Audit Committee
Independent Commissioners

Figure 1. Research Framework
Table 2. CSR Disclosure Scores
Yes
No
877
14,261
Source: Results of data processing
CSR disclosure is based on GRI
G.4, which consists of the economic,
environmental, social, human rights,
society, and product responsibility
dimensions. From all CSR dimensions,
the percentage of the total score of
CSR by high profile companies in
Indonesia amounted to 6%. This
indicates that the disclosure of CSR
in Indonesia is still very low. CSR

% Total Score Disclosure
6%

disclosure in Indonesia, especially
for high-profile companies, is not
fully connected to actual corporate
social responsibility. The low CSR
also indicates that investors do not
pay attention to CSR as an element in
decision-making for the company. It
also shows that not many companies
are doing CSR activities in detail
according to GRI.
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Table 3. CSR Disclosure Level
Dimension
Economic
Environmental
Social
Human rights
Society
Product responsibility

% Level of Disclosure
14%
4%
9%
1%
7%
6%

Table 4. R-Square
Description
CSR disclosure
Bid-ask spread
Trading volume
Share price volatility
Source: PLS Output (Data processed)
Details of the results of CSR disclosure
level based on GRI G.4 consisting of
the economic, environmental, social,
human rights, society and product
responsibility dimension are shown in
Table 3 above:
Goodness of Fit Test
Goodness of fit test results are shown
in Table 4 above:
Based on the above table, the value of
Q2 is as follows:
Q2 = 1- (1-CSRD2) (1-BASP2)
(1-TRVO2) (1-SPVO2)
Q2 = 1- (1-0,98) (1-0,98) (1-0,98)
(1-0,28)
Q2 = 1- (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.72)
Q2 = 1- 0.00000576
Q2 = 0.99999424 = 99.99%
The Proportion of Managerial
Ownership and CSR Disclosure
The test results show that H1 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.090 (positive sign) and the p-value
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R-Square
0,98
0,98
0,98
0,28

of 0.162 (p 0.162 > 0.05) mean that the
proportion of managerial ownership
has no effect on CSR disclosure. This
study supports the agency theory,
which states that the conflict of interest
between management and owners will
be larger when managerial ownership
gets smaller. When the managerial
ownership is small, then the manager’s
actions are not productive.
The
Proportion
of
Domestic
Institutional Ownership and CSR
Disclosure
The test results show that H2 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.082 (positive sign) and the p-value
of 0.286 (p 0.286 > 0.05) means that
the proportion of domestic institutional
ownership has no effect on CSR
disclosure. This indicates that domestic
institutional investors are not pressing
the company to disclose CSR in detail
in the company’s annual report because
domestic institutional investors do not
consider CSR as a consideration in
making investments.
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The Proportion of Foreign Institutional
Ownership and CSR Disclosure
The test results show that H3 is
not supported. The path coefficient
of -0.287 (negative sign) and the
p-value less than 0.001 (p 0.001 <
0.05) means that the proportion of
foreign institutional ownership has a
negative and significant effect on CSR
disclosure. There is the possibility that
foreign investors pay little attention to
CSR because CSR activities require
considerable cost and may reduce
corporate profits, while investors
generally expect a substantial profit
from the company.
The Proportion of Public Ownership
and CSR Disclosure
The test results show that H4 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.515 (positive sign) and the p-value
of 0.190 (p 0.190 > 0.05) means that
the proportion of public ownership has
no effect on CSR disclosure.
The Proportion of the Board of Directors
from the Board of Commissioners and
Audit Committee and CSR Disclosure
The test results show that H5 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.136 (positive sign) and the p-value
of 0.054 (p 0.054 < 0.10) means that
the proportion of the board of directors
from the board of commissioners and
audit committee have a positive and
significant effect on CSR disclosure.
The Proportion of the Board
of Directors from the Board of
Commissioners, Board of Directors
and Audit Committee and CSR
Disclosure
The test results indicate that H6 is
not supported. The path coefficient of
0.310 (positive sign) and the p-value
less than 0.01 (p 0.01 < 0.05) means that
the proportion of the board of directors

from the board of commissioners, audit
committee, and board of directors has a
positive and significant effect on CSR
disclosure. The board of directors,
as part of the corporate governance
structure, can lead management to
better disclose CSR. High disclosure
of CSR describes that the board of
directors has been carrying out its
obligations to investors by providing
as much information as possible.
The Proportion of Independent
Commissioner and Audit Committee
from the Board of Commissioner
and the Audit Committee and CSR
Disclosure
The test results show that H7 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.026 (positive sign) and the p-value
of 0.338 (p 0.338 > 0.05) means
that the proportion of independent
commissioners and audit committee
from the board of commissioners and
audit committee has no effect on CSR
disclosure. The results of study indicate
that the existence of independent
directors in corporate governance has
not been able to play an important
role in affecting the determination
of company policies and affecting
the duty of the audit committee to
focus on maintaining the credibility
of financial reporting, so that CSR is
often overlooked.
The Proportion of Independent
Commissioner and Audit Committee
from the Board of Commissioners,
Audit Committee and Board of
Directors and CSR Disclosure
The test results show that H8 is
supported. The path coefficient of
0.140 (positive sign) and the p-value
of 0.03 (p 0.03 < 0.05) means that
the proportion of independent
commissioner and audit committee
from the board of commissioners, audit
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Table 5. SEM Testing Results
No Variable Relationships
1
PKM → CSRD
2
PKID → CSRD
3
PKIA → CSRD
4
PKPU→ CSRD
5
PDKA→ CSRD
6
PDDK→ CSRD
7
PKKA→ CSRD
8
PKDK→ CSRD
9
CSRD →BASP
10 CSRD →TRVO
11 CSRD →SPVO
Source: PLS Output (Data processed)
committee, and board of directors has a
positive and significant effect on CSR
disclosure.
CSR Disclosure and Bid-Ask Spread
The test results show that H9 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.992 (positive sign) and the p-value
less than 0.001 (p 0.001 < 0.05) means
that CSR disclosure has a positive
and significant effect on the bid-ask
spread. The researchers guess that
there is a high information asymmetry
between management and investors,
which results in a high bid-ask spread,
thus giving a negative response to
the market. The results of this study
do not support the signaling theory,
which states that companies providing
information or signals can reduce
information asymmetry.
CSR Disclosure and Trading Volume
The test results show that H10 is
supported. The path coefficient of
0.990 (positive sign) and the p-value
less than 0.001 (p 0.001 < 0.05)
means that CSR disclosure has a
positive and significant effect on
trading volume.
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Path Coefficient
0,090
0,082
-0,287
0,515
0,136
0,330
0,026
0,169
0,992
0,990
0,532

P-Values
0,162
0,286
<0,001*
0,190
0,054
0,106
0,388
0,095
<0,001*
<0,001*
0,064

CSR Disclosure and Share Price
Volatility
The test results show that H11 is not
supported. The path coefficient of
0.532 (positive sign) and the p-value of
0.064 (p 0.064 < 0.10) means that CSR
disclosure has a positive and significant
effect on the share price volatility. The
results of this study show that the higher
the disclosure of CSR in the company’s
annual report, the more positive increase
the share price volatility experienced,
meaning that investors pay attention
to CSR disclosure together in the
annual report as a consideration of their
investment decision.
Summaries of all the hypotheses testing
results are shown in Table 5 above:
CONCLUSION
Conclusions
Based on the findings and discussion set
forth above, a number of conclusions
can be made.
First, in Article 1, Paragraph 3 of
Company Law Republic of Indonesia
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No. 40/2007, social responsibility
is a commitment of the company to
participate in the sustainable economic
development to improve the quality
of life and environment is beneficial,
both for the company itself, the local
community, and society in general.
The research results showed that
the total score of CSR disclosure
of public companies in Indonesia
amounted to only 6%. This means
that most companies do not have a
strong commitment to implementing
CSR activities. This also means that
CSR is still viewed as a burden rather
than an opportunity that will provide
many benefits for companies and
communities.
Second, the results showed that the
proportion of the board of directors
from the board of commissioners
and audit committee positively and
significantly affected the disclosure
of CSR. This indicates that the board
of directors of public companies in
Indonesia under the supervision of the
board of commissioners and the audit
committee have strong commitments
to disclosing CSR. In other words, the
presence of the board of commissioners
and audit committee plays a very
important role in encouraging the board
of directors to provide transparency of
CSR to the public.
Third, the results also showed
that the proportion of independent
commissioners and the audit committee
from the board of commissioners, audit
committee, and the board of directors
positively and significantly affect the
disclosure of CSR. This suggests that
the independent commissioner and
audit committees of public companies
in Indonesia, which have the function
of oversight for the board of directors,
have a strong commitment to disclosing

CSR. In other words, the presence of
independent commissioners and the
audit committee plays a very important
role in improving the transparency of
public company CSR.
Fourth, the disclosure of CSR
positively and significantly affects
stock trading volume. This suggests
that CSR disclosures made by public
companies in Indonesia give a signal
that is responded to positively by
investors in the capital market.
Fifth, results showed that among the
several dimensions of CSR, the human
rights dimension is the dimension
that is at least disclosed by the public
companies in Indonesia, at only 1%.
The dimension most disclosed was the
economic dimension, with 14%. This
indicates that most public companies
in Indonesia are still oriented toward
economic interest rather than public
interest
(environmental,
social,
human rights, society, and product
responsibility).
Implications
CSR disclosure activities play a
very important role in meeting the
stakeholders’ interests and ensuring
the sustainability of the company longterm. In addition, CSR disclosure is also
considered to be an assertion of the brand
differentiation of a company, which
means to obtain a license to operate from
both the government and society, as
well as the company’s risk management
strategy. The findings showed that the
total score of CSR disclosure of public
companies in Indonesia amounted to
only 6%. Therefore, public companies
in Indonesia should be encouraged to
have a higher awareness of aspects of
CSR and also to disclose their CSR
activities.
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This study has several limitations.
1. The existence of an element of
subjectivity in assessing the CSR
disclosure in the annual report.
2. The number of research samples
is relatively small, with only 210
companies.
3. The type of company used as a
sample in this study only included
companies engaged in high-profile
industries, which are companies
with close ties to the community.
Therefore, it does not reflect the
overall stock market reaction.

Some suggestions need to be considered
for further research. To increase the level
of objectivity in the measurement of
CSR disclosure, assessment from other
parties (i.e., the second and even third
party) is required. Also, future studies
should improve the generalization of
the results by increasing the sample
size. To improve the specification of the
characteristics of the studied companies,
future research is recommended to
distinguish a sample of companies
by sector, such as manufacturing and
mining.
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